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AN INTRODUCTION TO AMERICAN TOXIC
TORT LAW: THREE OVERARCHING
METAPHORS AND THREE SOURCES OF LAW
ROBERT F. BLOMQIST
Toxic tort law is of relatively recent vintage in American law. Its origins
can be traced to the burgeoning growth in the industrial production of synthetic
chemical substances following World War II and society's reaction to this
growth.' Indeed, toxic tort actions typically involve plaintiffs who claim
Professor of Law, Valparaiso University School of Law. B.S., Economics, University of
Pennsylvania (1973); J.D., Cornell Law School (1977).
1. See PETER H. SCHUCK, AGENT ORANGE ON TRIAL: MASS ToXIc DISASTERS IN THE
COURTS 3 (1986). See generally Chemical Process fndusries, in 21 ENCY. BRIT. 251 (15th ed.
1985). As noted in a recent book, discussing chemical use in the "modem" era:
Citizens of developed countries rely on a vast number of chemical preparations:
cosmetics, shampoos, preservatives, plastics, solvents, detergents, insecticides,
petroleum fuels, inks, fertilizers, and many more. Although life is improved by
chemicals, some of them can harm human health, poison fish and wildlife, and pollute
rivers, air, and land....
Today 50,000 chemical substances are sold commercially in the United States.
Chemical usage has grown dramatically since 1940 .... The chemical industry has
become an industrial giant. In 1980 it reported total sales of $162 billion and employed
1.1 million people at 11,500 plants across the country.
Of these commercially important chemicals, only a small number - perhaps 2%-
are harmful. The remaining 98% are relatively harmless, either because they are not
poisonous or because people are not exposed to them during the production-consumption
cycle. Still, that small percentage amounts to hundreds of potentially dangerous
chemicals.
DANIEL D. CHIRAS, ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCE: A FRAMEWORK FOR DECISION MAKING 405
(1985).
As a parallel developmentto increased chemical production following World War H, "[d ]uring
the 1970s a series of dramatic episodes sharpened for the American people the experience of their
toxic environment." SAMUEL P. HAYS, BEAUTY, HEALTH AND PERMANENCE: ENVIRONMENTAL
POLITICS IN THE UNITED STATES, 1955-1985, at 188 (1987). This included:
Incidents involving kepone at Hopewell, Virginia; PCBs from the General Electric plant
on the upper Hudson River, polybrominated biphenyls dispersed into food in Michigan;
contaminated drinking water in New Orleans; hazardous wastes at Love Canal - all
creating wildly used buz words.
A general climate of distrust developed toward private and public institutions for
being unable to prevent and even to know about conditions that might lead to such
events. To public authorities such as the Environmental Protection Agency the task
appeared so enormous and resources so limited that only sporadic and cosmetic action
could be taken. To the chemical industry the dangers were grossly exaggerated and
proposed actions were unwarranted; it sought to minimize efforts to control toxic
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"actual or potential physical injuries, emotional distress, property damages, and
economic losses, which were caused by substances in the air, ground, and
water."2 Toxic tort disputes, therefore, have tended to be preoccupied with the
issue of toxicity: "the capacity of a chemical to produce injury or harm." 3
Lawsuits seeking compensation for various harmful substances have a rich
and varied history, going back to at least the 1940s.' Yet the first mention of
the concept "toxic tort" by an American court in a published opinion was not
until 1979.1 Since that seminal year, explicit judicial reference to the phrases
"toxic tort" or "toxic torts" has grown geometrically, accompanied by an
explosive expansion of what has become loosely known as toxic tort law: a
collection of common law decisions, statutory provisions, and scholarly
expositions about the legal consequences of harmful and potentially harmful
substances in the workplace and in a non-work setting.6 As it becomes more
prominent and visible, toxic tort law has become more controversial. It is in
vogue, for example, to argue that use of more rigorous science is a purpose of
chemicals. Even many public authorities shared the view of private industry that the
problems were far less than many thought; some were prone to belittle citizen concem
as involving "housewives' data" or "political pollutants.'
Id. (endnote omitted). Q. Robert F. Blomquist, 'Cean New World": Toward an Intellectual
History of American Environmenal Law, 1961-1990, 25 VAL. U. L. REV. 1, 22-24 (1990)
(discussing Rachel Carson and the idea of "Silent Spring" in American law).
2. To)c TORTS AND PRODucr LtABTLrrY: CHANGING TAcTICs FOR CHANGING TIMES 11
(Michael A. Brown ed., 1989).
3. STANLEY M. PIER ET AL., Recognition and Evaluation of Hazards in ToxIc TORTS:
LITIGATION OF HAZARDOUS SUBSTANCE CASES I (Gary Z. Nothstein ed., 1984).
4. See, e.g., Borel v. Fibreboard Paper Prod. Corp., 493 F.2d 1076 (5th Cir. 1973), cert.
denied, 419 U.S. 869 (1974) (asbestos); Tinnerholm v. Parke Davis & Co., 285 F. Supp. 432 (S.D.
N.Y. 1968), aff'd on other grounds, 411 F.2d 48 (2d Cir. 1969) (pharmaceuticals); Drayton v. Jiffe
Chem. Corp., 395 F. Supp. 1081 (N.D. Ohio 1975), affd on other grounds, 591 F.2d 352 (6th Cir.
1978) (liquid drain cleaner); Perry Creek Cranberry Corp. v. Hopkins Agric. Chem. Co., 139
N.W.2d 96 (Wis. 1966) (pesticides); Sinclair Prarie Oil Co. v. Stell, 124 P.2d 255 (Okla. 1942) (oil
wastes); Lartique v. RJ. ReynoldsTobacco Co., 317 F.2d 19 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 865
(1963) (cigarette smoke); Mahoney v. United States, 220 F. Supp. 823 (E.D. Tenn. 1963), af.id,
339 F.2d 605 (6th Cir. 1964) (radioactive material and gases); Garner v. Hecla Mining Co., 431
P.2d 794 (Utah 1967) (uranium); Bridgetonv. BP Oil, Inc., 369 A.2d 49 (NJ. Super. Ct. Law Div.
1976) (oil); Phillips v. Sun Oil Co., 121 N.E.2d 249 (N.Y. 1954) (groundwater pollution by
gasoline).
5. In re Agent Orange Liability Litigation, 506 F. Supp. 737 (E.D. N.Y. 1979), rev'd, 635
F.2d 987 (2d Cir. 1980), ceri. denied, 454 U.S. 1128 (1981).
6. Generic damages posed to workers due to occupational substance hazards include contact
with a variety of chemical agents, including particulates, gases, vapors and liquids. PIER E" AL.,
supra note 3, at 15-26. "In addition, the general public is exposed to dangers from contamination
of the environment outside the workplace. These dangers .. . include biological agents, air
pollution, water pollution, and hazardous waste." Id. at 26. See generally id. at 26-39.
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toxic tort law." Toxic tort law has also been criticized as lacking efficient
forms of institutional redress.'
Exponents of propositions of this sort are partially correct: all things being
equal, it is desirable to utilize better science in toxic tort disputes and, indeed,
there are possible administrative reforms that could make the resolution of toxic
tort controversies more efficient. These critics, however, tend to view toxic tort
law in an unrealistic and unduly narrow frame of reference. Saying that more
rigorous science is appropriate or that judicial resolution of toxic tort cases is
presently inefficient is not very helpful in understanding the complex! functions
served by American toxic tort law. In place of narrow normative judgments
about the subject, a comprehensive theory of what toxic tort law is, and should
be necessary. Thus, the overriding purpose of future toxic tort scholarship
should be to suggest such a comprehensive vision.
I. THREE OVERARCHING METAPHORS
In the spirit of James Boyd White's view of the law as "a kind of rhetorical
and literary activity," 0 I contend that toxic tort law in late twentieth century
American culture must be understood as an interaction of three overarching
metaphors which give the subject its present meaning, while cabining, to a
degree, efforts at future reform. First, as observed by commentators such as
Don Elliott," toxic tort law is a kind of morality play involving the Aristotelian
notion of ethos.12 Indeed, "[tioxic tort cases are about good and evil, about
7. See, e.g., Peter W. Huber, On Law and Sclosophy, 24 VAL. U. L. REV. 319 (1990); PETER
W. HUBER, GALuLEO'S REVENGE: JUNK SCIENCE IN THE COURTROOM (1991). Cf. Robert F.
Blomquist, Science, Toxic Ton Law, and Expert Evidence: A Reaction to Peter Huber, 44 ARK. L.
REv. 629 (1991).
8. See, e.g., ScHUCK, supra note 1, at 286-97.
9. C. Robert F. Blomquist, The Beauty of Complexity, 39 HASTINGs LJ. 555 (1988) (book
review) [hereinafter The Beauty of Complexity].
10. JAMES BOYD WHITE, Foreward to HERACLES' Bow: ESSAYS ON THE RHETORIC AND
POETICS OF THE LAW x (1985).
11. See E. Donald Elliott, The Future of Toxic Torts: Of Chemophobia, Risk as a Compensable
Injury and Hybrid Compensation Systems, 25 Hous. L. REv. 781, 781-82 (1988).
12. See THE RHETORIC & THE POETICS OF ARISTOTLE (Modem Library 1954). The Greek
word ethos signifies the character of a person. As noted by Aristotle:
Persuasion is achieved by the speaker's personal character when the speech is so spoken
as to make us think him credible. We believe good men more fully and more readily
than others; this is true generally whatever the question is, and absolutely true where
exact certainty is impossible and opinions are divided. This kind of persuasion, like the
others, should be achieved by what the speaker says, not by what people think of his
character before he begins to speak. It is not true, as some writers assume in their
treatises on rhetoric, that the personal goodness revealed by the speaker contributes
nothing to his power of persuasion; on the contrary, his character may almost be called
the most effective means of persuasion he possesses.
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corporate greed and indifference, and about the risk of the unknown. [Toxic
tort cases are about redefining our public morality for a new era in which we
must confront the troubling truth that we do not fully comprehend the
relationships between the things that we have made and our health and well-
being."13
Second, toxic tort law should also be viewed, in part, as a New England-
style town meeting where pathos,4 or societal reaction to emotional questions
of justice and equity, is joined with pragmatic community determination of
liability and damage questions involving chemical substances, human health, and
property. Seen in such a light, toxic tort litigants should not be held to the
inappropriately high standards of pure scientific inquiry. Rather, by way of
illustration, Tony Roisman properly points out in his discussion of legal
causation in toxic tort disputes that:
[Toxic tort litigants should not be required] to prove to a scientific
certainty, causation. Scientists have a different theory of causation,
it's much closer to the criminal liability standard "beyond any
reasonable doubt." [Toxic tort litigants should only be required] to
establish causation "at a moment in time." At this moment in time,
we ask the jury, take the available information in front of you and
.answer the question: What caused these injuries? That's a "more
probable than not standard," 51 percent is what's required. And..
. those kinds ofjudgments that scientists make are fine when scientists
are in their own sphere. When we are in the legal realm, where we
need answers, you can't tell the people of the country,... "we don't
know to a scientific certainty beyond all reasonable doubt exactly what
did this, and another 50 years worth of exposures will produce enough
bodies for us to be certain." That's not an answer. The law is more
humane than that, and the law says we've got to answer the question
now. 15
Id. at 25.
13. Elliott, supra note 11, at 782. See generally PHIL BROWN & EDWIN J. MIKKELSEN, No
SAFE PLACE: TOXIC WASTE, LEUKEMIA AND COMMUNITY ACTION (1990).
14. "Whereas ethos consists in the establishment of... credibility and credentials ... pathos
consists in arousing the passions of the listeners, getting their emotions running in the direction of
the action to be taken." MORTIMER J. ADLER, How TO SPEAK, How TO LISTEN 36 (1983). In
Aristotle's own words: "(P]ersuasion may come through the hearers, when the speech stirs their
emotions. Ourjudgments when we are pleased and friendly are not the same as when we are pained
and hostile." ARISTOTLE, supra note 12, at 25.
15. Toxic Trials (P.B.S. television broadcast, Feb. 25, 1986, statement of Tony Roisman,
discussing proof problems of victims of Woburn, Massachusetts groundwater contamination)
(transcript on file with author). Cf BROwN & MIKKELSEN, supra note 13. See also Robert F.
Blomquist, Goals, Means, and Problems for Modem Ton Law: A Reply to Professor Priest, 22
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Finally, and by way of a limiting metaphor, toxic tort law should also be
understood as a series of continuing public lectures in the spirit of the Chautuaqa
and Lyceum movements - dedicated to logos, or logical exposition!6 of
scientific principles, policy issues, and human suffering. It is not enough that
people assemble in political gatherings while enacting morality plays.
Knowledgeable and competent experts need to be a part of the process.
Knowledgeable and competent experts must be held accountable for their
opinions, scientific judgments, and technological assessments. While experts
should not dominate the proceedings, they should nevertheless clearly be major
voices in helping to resolve toxic tort disputes.1
7
11. THREE SOURCES OF LAW
Toxic tort law has captured considerable popular attention and scholarly
interest during the last decade because of vigorous interaction between three
dynamic and important areas of substantive law: tort law, environmental law,
and bankruptcy law. Peter Schuck observed that "[miodern tort law is one of
the most rapidly changing and controversial areas of American law."' The
controversial nature of modem tort law is linked to unresolved social and
political tensions that seek to change the individualistic, moralistic, and arbitral
moorings of traditional tort law, derived from English common law, with "a
more collectivist, functional, and managerial" approach. 9
Second, environmental law has tended to influence and, concomitantly, to
be affected by highly visible and contentious tort litigation during the last
decade. In one respect, there has always been a symbiotic relationship between
traditional tort law principles and problems of human health, aesthetic
enjoyment, and resource use. For example, as observed by William H.
Rodgers, Jr., "[tjhe legal history of the environment has been written by
nuisance law." 2' Indeed, "[nluisance actions have reached pollution of air,
water, and land, and by a wide variety of means, have challenged virtually
every major industrial and municipal activity that today is the subject of
VAL. U. L. REV. 621, 631 (1988).
16. The Greek word logos signifies 'the marshaling of reasons." ADLER, supra note 14, at 37.
According to Aristotle: O(P]ersuasion is effected through the speech itself when we have proved a
truth or an apparent truth by means of the persuasive arguments suitable to the case in question."
ARISTOTLE, supra note 12, at 25.
17. See generally Blomquist, Science, supra note 7. C. EDWARD J. IMWINKELREID, THE
METHODS OF ATTACIrNO SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE (1982).
18. PErER H. ScIlucK, Introduction: The Contet of the Controversy, in TORT LAW AND THE
PunLic INTEREST 17 (Peter H. Schuck ed., Norton 1991).
19. SCHUCK, supra note 1, at 12.
20. WILLM H. RODGERs, JR., I ENVIRONMENTAL LAW: AIR AND WATER 1 (1986).
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comprehensive environmental regulation." 2  Nuisance law, as a grand
balancing process of individual and social interests, has tended to evolve into a
modem organizing theme, or fulcrum, for other tort theories that have
occasionally been used to resolve environmental disputes in the courts. Thus,
resort to legal theories of strict liability for dangerous activities creates
indeterminate tensions as a result of an "open-ended invitation to balanc[e]"
competing circumstances such as "appropriateness to the place" and "the value
of the activity in the community"' in determining whether a particular
hazardous activity is abnormally dangerous.
Similarly, an indeterminate and open-textured balancing of interests
approach, historically derived from the model of nuisance law, has tended to
subsume other traditional rights-based concepts such as trespass, inverse
condemnation, riparian rights, and public trust arguments in litigation involving
land and natural resource use - two important environmental issues faced by the
courts.3 In a second respect, based on the doctrine of negligence per se,
which incorporates relevant statutory and administrative standards into a duty of
due care, recent environmental laws are germane to the conduct of toxic tort
litigation.' A third area of interaction between tort and environmental law is
the use of information by toxic tort litigants that is drawn from environmental
statistics required to be kept by legislative command.'
Finally, bankruptcy law has uniquely served to dramatize the equitable
21. Blomquist, Beauty of Complexity, supra note 9, at 558.
22. RoDGERs, supra note 20, at 38.
23. Id.
24. See, e.g., Gibson v. Worley Mills, Inc., 614 F.2d 464 (5th Cir.), modified on other
grounds, 620 F.2d 567 (5th Cir. 1980) (violation of state and federal laws regarding sale of seed
containing toxic bindweed seed was negligence per se since laws were designed to protect plaintiff's
class and to prevent the type of hazard and resulting damage to land that had occurred); Perry Creek
Cranberry Corp. v. Hopkins Agric. Chem. Co., 139 N.W.2d 96 (Wis. 1966) (failure to follow the
Wisconsin Economic Poisons Act in the labeling of malathion was negligence per se, and presence
of disclaimer on labels was no defense). According to a recent commentator:
To the extent that the lack of clearly enunciated standards has deterred environmental
tort litigation in the past, the recent increase in statutes and regulations which impose
standards of conduct regarding the environment, health, and safety should aid plaintiffs
significantly in defining what constitutes negligence. Equally important, the statutes and
regulations and the activities of the enforcement agencies have created greater awareness
in the public and the judiciary of the risk of dangers from pollutants emanating from
such sources as nuclear energy plants, chemical plants, and toxic waste sites, as well as
the gravity of those dangers and the foreserability of the risks.
Lynn Pollan, Theories of Liability, in Toxic ToRTS, supra note 3, at 310.
25. See generally Robert F. Blomquist, The Logic and Limits of Public Information Mandates
Under Federal Hazardous Waste Law: A Policy Analysis, 14 VT. L. REv. 559 (1990).
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 26, No. 3 [1992], Art. 7
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dilemmas in individual toxic tort cases.26 This is so because the two basic
policies of bankruptcy law, the debtor fresh start and equitable distribution tend
to compete with both the tort law goal of full compensation for injuries suffered
and the related environmental law principle that the polluter should pay for
externalities foisted upon the public by discharge of residuals. Thus, by treating
a toxic tort injury like any other "claim," bankruptcy law seeks to aggregate the
public outrage occasioned by a debtor's environmental lawlessness and the
individual injury or risk of injury brought about by a debtor's tortious conduct
with other similar harms, as well as with what may be termed mere commercial
expectancies.' Indeed, under the current regime of American bankruptcy law,
many commercial creditors like banks, suppliers, and equipment factors are
given a favored status over toxic tort victims because of the advance
transactional opportunity of collateralizing their claims and realizing a prioritized
secured claim status over unsecured tort claimants.' Indeed, while the former
usually recover the full amount of their claims, subject to the value of the
collateral, the latter often recover little or nothing.
CONCLUSION
These three metaphors (toxic tort law as a morality play, a town meeting,
and a public lecture) and three sources of substantive law (tort law,
26. See, e.g., RICHARD B. SOBOL, BENDINO THE LAW: THE STORY OF THE DALKON SHIELD
BANKRUPTCY (1991).
27. Under the Federal Bankruptcy Code:
Aclaim" means 
-
(A) right to payment, whether or not such right is reduced to judgment, liquidated,
unliquidated, fixed, contingent, matured, unmatured, disputed, undisputed, legal,
equitable, secured, or unsecured; or
(B) right to an equitable remedy for breach of performance if such breach gives rise to
a right to payment, whether or not such right to an equitable remedy is reduced to
judgment, fixed, contingent, matured, unmatured, disputed, secured or unsecured..
I1 U.S.C. § 101(5) (1990).
The operation of this bankruptcy principle in toxic tort litigation is illustrated by Judge
Merhige's ruling in the Dalkon Shield bankruptcy proceeding:
Judge Merhige ruled that a claim arises, for purposes of federal bankruptcy law, at the
time of the conduct giving rise to the injury, not at the time the injury is manifest,
regardless of when state law recognizes a right to bring suit. Under this view, every
woman who used the Dalkon Shield had a claim against Robins from the moment of
insertion, even though an injury might never occur. In reaching this conclusion,
Merhige relied on the broad definition of the word "claim" in the Bankruptcy Code and
on language in the House and Senate Committee reports on the 1978 Act, which express
the intention that 'all legal obligations of the debtor, no matter how remote or
contingent, will be able to be dealt with in the bankruptcy case."
SOBOL, supra note 26, at 114 (endnotes omitted).
28. See 1 U.S.C. § 506 (1990).
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environmental law, and bankruptcy law) help to clarify and amplify the dynamic
nature of modem toxic tort law. This approach is heuristic, helping to lend
some order to chaos, while spurring the discovery of organized patterns amid
the varied details of individual cases.
Future toxic tort scholarship' should seek to explore key questions of the
29. A selective bibliography of the most important articles, chapters, and books dealing with
toxic torts published during the last several years is as follows:
Books:
NATIONAL CENTER FOR STATE COURTS, JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATIVE WORKING GROUP ON
ASBESTOS LITIGATION, FINAL REPORT WITH RECOMMENDATIONS (1984); KEVIN BUSHNELL &
WILLIAM JORDAN, RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN ASBESTOS LITIGATION (1984); PAUL BRODEUR,
OUTRAGEOUS MISCONDUCT: THE ASBESTOS INDUSTRY ON TRIAL (1985); SHELDON D.
ENOELMAYER & ROBERT J. WAGMAN, LORD'S JUSTICE: ONE JUDGE'S BATTLE TO EXPOSE THE
DEADLY DALKON SHIELD I.U.D. (1985); DEBORAH R. HENSLER ET AL., ASBESTOS IN THE COURTS:
THE CHALLENGE OF MASS TOXIC TORTS (1985); JAMES S. KAKAUK ET AL., VARIATION IN
ASBESTOS LITIGATION COMPENSATION AND EXPENSES (1984); MORTON MINTZ, AT ANY COST:
CORPORATE GREED, WOMEN, AND THE DALKON SHIELD (1985); SUSAN L. PERRY & JiM DAWSON,
NIGHTMARE: WOMEN AND THE DALKON SHIELD (1985); PETER H. SCHUCK, AGENT ORANGE ON
TRIAL (1986); MOLLY SELVIN & LARRY PICUS, THE DEBATE OVER JURY PERFORMANCE:
OBSERVATIONS FROM A RECENT ASBESTOS CASE (1987); THOMAS E. WILLOING, TRENDS IN
ASBESTOS LITIGATION (1987).
Articles:
Abraham & Merrill, Scientific Uncertainty in the Courts, In ISSUES SCI. & TECH., Winter
1986, at 93; Barbara A. Atwood, The Choice-of-Law Dilemma in Mass Tort Litigation: Kicking
Around Eric, Klaxon, and Van Dusen, 19 CONN. L. REV. 9 (1986); Gregory A. Bibler, The Status
of Unaccrued Tort Claims in Chapter )) Bankruptcy Proceedings, 61 AM. BANKR. LJ. 145 (1987);
Bert Black, A Unified Theory of Scientific Evidence, 56 FoRDHAM L. REVIEW 595 (1988); Bert
Black & David E. Lilienfeld, Epidemiologic Proof in Toxic Tort Litigation, 52 FORDHAM L. REVIEW
732 (1984); Kenneth S. Bordens & Irwin A. Horowitz, Mass Tort Clvii Litigation: The Impact of
Procedural Changes on Jury Decisions, 73 JUDICATURE 22 (1989); Wayne D. Brazil, Special
Masters in Complex Cases: Extending the Judiciary or Reshaping Adjudication?, 53 U. CHI. L.
REV. 394 (1986); Troyen A. Brennan, Helping Courts With Toxic Torts: Some Proposals Regarding
Alternative Methods for Presenting and Assessing Scientific Evidence in Common Law Courts, 51
U. Prr. L. REV. 1 (1989); Robert A. Bush, Between Two Worlds: The Shift From Individual to
Group Responsibility in the Law of Causation of Injury, 33 UCLA L. REV. 1473 (1986); Robert A.
Bush, My Brother's Keeper - Some Observations on Federal Rule 23 and Mass Tort Class Actions
in the United States (pts. 1 & 2), 5 CIV. JUST. Q. 109, 201 (1986); Frank B. Cross, Asbestos in
Schools: A Remonstrance Against Panic, 11 COLUM. 1. ENVTL. L. 73 (1986); Richard Delgado,
Beyond Sindel1,Relaxation of Cause-in-Fact Rules for Indeterm inate Plaintiffs, 70 CAL. L. REV. 881
(1982); Michael Dore, A Proposed Standardfor Evaluating the Use of Epidemlological Evidence in
Toxic Tort and Other Personal Injury Cases, 28 How. LJ. 677 (1985); Dan Drazan, The Case for
Special Juries in Toxic Tort Litigation, 72 JUDICATURE 292 (1989); Richard A. Epstein, Agent
Orange Diseases: Problems of Causality, Burdens of Proof and Restitution, TRIAL, Nov. 1983, at
91; Richard A. Epstein, The Legal and Insurance Dynamics of Mass Tort Litigation, 13 1. LEGAL
STUD. 475 (1984); Daniel A. Farber, Toxic Causation, 71 MINN. L. REV. 1219 (1987); Kenneth
R. Feinberg, The Toxic Tort Litigation Crisis: Conceptual Problems and Proposed Solutions, 24
Hous. L. REV. 155 (1987); Kevin M. Forde, Punitive Damages in Mass Tort Cases: Recovery on
Behalfofa Class, 14 Loy. U. CHI. LJ. 397 (1984); Michael D. Green, The Inability of Offensive
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 26, No. 3 [1992], Art. 7
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Collateral Estoppel to Fulfill Its Promise: An Examination of Estoppel in Asbestos Litigation, 70
IOWA L. REv. 141 (1984); Michael D. Green, The Paradox of Statutes of Limitations in Toxic
Substances Litigation, 76 CAL. L. REV. 965 (1988); Hamilton, Rabinovitz& Szanton, Inc., Cutting
the Overhead Costs of Resolving Asbestos Claims: A 7ime For Action, 6 J. PROD. LIAB. 17 (1983);
Ora Fred Harris, Toxic Tort Litigation and the Causation Element: Is There Any Hope of
Reconciliation?, 40 SW. LJ. 909 (1986); Sherrill P. Hondorf, A Mandate for the Procedural
Management of Mass Exposure Litigation, 16 N. KY. L. REv. 541 (1989); Peter Huber, The
Bhopalization of U.S. Tort Law, ISSUES SCI. & TECH., Fall 1985, at 73; Vincent R. Johnson,
Ethical Limitations on Creative Financing of Mass Tort Class Actions, 54 BROOK. L. REv. 539
(1988); Allan Kanner, Future Trends in Toxic Ton Litigation, 20 RUTGERS LJ. 667 (1989); Harvey
J. Kesner, Future Asbestos Related Litigants as Holders of Statutory Claims Under Chapter 11 of
the Bankruptcy Code and Their Place in the Johns-Manville Reorganization, 62 AM. BANKR. LJ.
69 (1988); Herbert M. Kritzer, Public Notification Campaigns in Mass Litigation: The Dalkon
Shield Case, 13 JusT. SYS. J. 220 (1988-89); Nonnan J. Landau, Hurdling the Barriers to Toxic
Ton Recovery: An Update, TRIAL, April 1983, at 40; Robert D. Lang, Danger in the Classroom:
Asbestos In the Public Schools, 10 COLum. 1. ENVTL. L. 111 (1985); Richard 0. Lempert, C7vil
Juries and Complex Cases: Let's Not Rush to Judgment, 80 MICH. L. REv. 68 (1981); Frances E.
McGovern, Management of Multipany Toxic Ton Litigation: Case Law and Trends Affecting Case
Management, 19 FORUM 1 (1983); Francis E. McGovern, Resolving Mature Mass Tort Litigation,
69 B.U. L. REV. 659 (1989); Francis E. McGovern, Toxic Substances Litigation in the Fourth
Circuit, 16 U. RICH. L. REV. 247 (1982); Linda S. Mullenix, Beyond Consolidation: Post-
Aggregative Procedure in Asbestos Mass Ton Litigation, 32 WM. & MARY L. REV. 475 (1991);
Linda S. Mullenix, Class Resolution of the Mass-Tort Case: A Proposed Federal Procedure Act,
64 TEX. L. REV. 1039 (1986); Charles Nesson, Agent Orange Meets the Blue Bus: Facifinding at
the Frontier of Knowledge, 66 B.U. L. REV. 521 (1986); David T. Peterson & Thomas P. Redick,
Innovations and Considerations in Settling Toxic Tort Litigation, 3 NAT. RESOURCES & ENV'T J.
9 (1988); Robert L. Rabin, Environmental Liability and the Ton System, 24 HoUs. L. REV. 27
(1987); Paul D. Rheingold, The Hymowitz Decision - Practical Aspects of New York DES Litigation,
55 BROOK. L. REV. 883 (1989); Paul D. Rheingold, The MER129 Story - An Instance of Successful
Mass Disaster Litigation, 56 CAL. L. REV. 116 (1968); Paul D. Rheingold, New Frontiers in
Causation and Damages: Compensating Clients Injured by Toxic Tons, TRIAL, October 1986, at
42; Michael D. Ricciuti, Equity and Accountability in the Reform of Settlement Procedures in Mass
Tort Cases: The Ethical Duty to Consult, I GEo. J. LEGAL. ETHICS 817 (1988); Glen 0. Robinson,
Multiple Causation in Ton Law: Reflections on the DES Cases, 68 VA. L. REV. 713 (1982); Glen
0. Robinson, Probabilistic Causation and Compensation for Tortious Risk, 14 J. LEGAL STUD. 779
(1985); Mark J. Roe, Bankruptcy and Mass Ton, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 846 (1984); Mark J. Roe,
Corporate Strategic Reaction to Mass Ton, 72 VA. L. REV. 1 (1986); David Rosenberg, Of End
Games and Openings in Mass Tort Cases: Lessons From a Special Master, 69 B.U. L. REV. 695
(1989); David Rosenberg, Class Actions for Mass Tons: Doing Individual Justice by Collective
Means, 62 IND. L.J. 561 (1987); David Rosenberg, The Causal Connection in Mass Tort Exposure
Cases: A "Public Law" Vision of the Tort System, 97 HARv. L. REV. 849 (1984); David
Rosenberg, Toxic Tort Litigation: Crisis or Chrysalis? A Comment on Feinberg's Conceptual
Problems and Proposed Solutions, 24 HOUS. L. REV. 183 (1987); Eric S. Roth, Confronting
Solicitation of Mass Disaster Victims, 2 GEO. 3. LEGAL ETHICS 967 (1989); Alvin E. Rubin, Mass
Tons and Litigation Disasters, 20 GA. L. REV. 429 (1986); J. B. Ruhl, Toxic Ton Remedies: The
Case Against the "SuperduperFtnd"and Other Reforn Proposals, 38 BAYLOR L. REV. 597 (1986);
Robert H. Sand, How Much Is Enough? Observations in Light of the Agent Orange Settlement, 9
HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 283 (1985); Peter H. Schuck, The Role of Judges in Settling Complex
Cases: The Agent Orange Example, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 337 (1986); Alan Schwartz, Products
Liability, Corporate Structure, and Bankruptcy: Toxc Substances and the Remote Risk Relationship,
14 . LEGAL STUD. 689 (1985); Richard A. Seltzer, Punitive Damages in Mass Tort Litigation:
Blomquist: An Introduction to American Toxic Tort Law:  Three Overarching Me
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 1992
804 VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 26
Addressing the Problems of Fairness, Efficiency and Control, 52 FORDHAm L. REvIEW 37 (1983);
Leslie Ellen Tick, Beyond the Dalkon Shield: Proving Causation Against IUD Manufacturers for
PID Related Injury, 13 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 639 (1983); Roger H. Trangarud, Joinder
Alternatives in Mass Tort Litigation, 70 CORNELL L. REv. 779 (1985); Jeffrey Trauberman,
Statutory Reform of 'Toxic Tors'." Relieving Legal, Scientific, and Economic Burdens on the
Chemical Victim, 7 HARV. ENvTL. L. REv. 177 (1983); Sheldon L. Trubatch, Informed Judicial
Decisionmaking: A Suggestion For a Judicial Office for Understanding Science and Technology,
10 COLUM. J. EN'VTL. L. 255 (1985); Jack B. Weinstein, Improving Expert Testimony, 20 U. RICH.
L. REV. 473 (1986); Jack B. Weinstein, Preliminary Reflections on the Law's Reaction to Disasters,
11 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 1 (1986); Jack B. Weinstein, Procedural and Substantive Problems in
Complex Litigation Arising From Disasters, 5 TOURo L. REV. 1 (1988); Jack B. Weinstein, The
Role of the Court in Toxic Ton Litigation, 73 CEO. L.J. 1389 (1985); Harry H. Wellington,
Asbestos: The Private Management of a Public Problem, 33 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 375 (1984-85);
Richard W. Wright, Actual Causation vs. Probabilistic Linkage: The Bane of Economic Analysis,
14 J. LEGAL STUD. 435 (1985); Richard W. Wright, Causation, Responsibility, Risk, Probability,
Naked Statistics, and Proof. Pruning the Bramble Bush by Clarifying the Concepts, 73 IOWA L.
REv. 1001 (1988).
Miscellaneous:
Book Note, 99 HARv. L. REV. 875 (1986) (reviewing SHELDON ENGELMAYER & ROBERT
WAGMAN, LORD JUSTICE: ONE JUDGE'S BATTLETO EXPOSE THE DEADLY DALKON SHIELD I.U.D.
(1985)); Richard L. Marcus, Apocalypse Now?, 85 MICH. L. REV. 1267 (1987) (reviewing PETER
H. SCHUCK, AGENT ORANGE ON TRIAL: MASS TO=c DISASTERS IN THE COURTS (1986)); Joseph
A. Page, Asbestos andDalkon Shield: Corporate America on Trial, 85 MICH. L. REV. 1324 (1987)
(reviewing MORTON MINTZ, AT ANY COST: CORPORATE GREED, WOMEN, AND THE DALKON
SHIELD (1985) and PAUL BRODEUR, OUTRAGEOUS MISCONDUCT: THE ASBESTOS INDUSTRY ON
TRIAL (1985)); Robert L. Rabin, Tort System on Trial: The Burden of Mass Toxics Litigation, 98
YAW LEJ. 813 (1989) (reviewing PETER H. SCHUCK, AGENT ORANGE ON TRIAL: MASS TOxic
DISASTERS IN THE COURTS (enlarged ed. 1987)); David Rosenberg, The Dusting of America: A
Story of Asbestos - Carnage, Cover-up and Litigation, 99 HLRv. L. REV. 1693 (1986) (reviewing
PAUL BRODEUR, OUTRAGEOUS MISCONDUCT: THE ASBESTOS INDUSTRY ON TRIAL (1985));
Annotation, "Concert ofAcivity," "Alternative Liability," Fnterprise Liability,' or Similar Theory
as Basis for Imposing Liability Upon One or More Manufacturers of Defective Uniform Product, in
Absence of Identification of Manufacturer of Precise Unit or Batch Causing Injury, 22 A.L.R. 4th
183 (1983); Conference, Rethinking Tor and Environmental Liability Laws: Needs and Objectives
of the Late 20th Century and Beyond, 24 HOUS. L. REV. I (1987); Developments in the Law - Toxic
Waste Litigation, 99 HARV. L. REV. 1458 (1986); Anne Hardiman, Recent Developments, Toxic
Torts and Chapter 11 Reorganization: The Problem of Future Claims, 38 VAND. L. REv. 1369
(1985); Special Project, An Analysis of the Legal, Social, and Political Issues Raised by Asbestos
Litigation, 36 VAND. L. REv. 573 (1983); Symposium, Conflict of Laws and Complex Litigation
Issues in Mass Tort Litigation, 1989 U. ILL. L. REV. 35; Symposium, Mass Torts After Agent
Orange, 52 BROOK. L. Rsv. 329 (1986); Symposium, Toxic Torts: Judicial and Legislative
Responses, 28 VILL. L. REV. 1083 (1982-83); Note, Adjudicating Asbestos Insurance Liability:
Alternatives to Contract Analysis, 97 HARv. L. REV. 739 (1984); Jonathon M. Gutoff, Note,
Admiralty Jurisdiction Over Asbestos Torts: Unknotting the Tangled Fibers, 54 U. CHI. L. REV.
312 (1987); Patrick Francis Harrigan, Note, Affirmative Judicial Case Management: A Viable
Solution to the Toxic Product Litigation Crisis, 38 ME. L. REV. 339 (1986); Lindsey Downing,
Comment, The Agent Orange Litigation: Should Federal Common Law Have Been Applied?, 10
ECOLOGY L.Q. 611 (1983); Jeffrey S. Brenner, Note, Alternatives to Litigation: Toxic Torts and
Alternative Dispute Resolution - A Proposed Solution to the Mass Tort Case, 20 RUTGERS LJ. 779
(1989); Leland G. Smith, Comment, The Asbestos Claims Facility - An Alternative to Litigation,
24 DUQ. L. REV. 833 (1986); Lindsey J. Brenza, Note, Asbestos in Schools and the Economic Lass
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 26, No. 3 [1992], Art. 7
https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol26/iss3/7
1992] AMERICAN TOXIC TORT LAW 805
subject in the context of the three overarching metaphors and three sources of
law suggested above. A systematic and coherent text would encompass the
following outline:
1. Historical Background: American Toxic Tort Law, 1979-87.
2. Historical Evolution: American Toxic Tort Law, 1988-91.
3. Determining Toxic Liabilities and the Basic Role and Limitations
of Traditional Tort Law.
4. Refining Toxic Liabilities: The Problems of Establishing Tort
Causation.
5. Establishing Damages in Toxic Tort Litigation.
6. Statutory Influences: Policy Interactions of Environmental Law
and Bankruptcy Law with Toxic Tort Law.
7. The Role of Courts in Toxic Tort Litigation: Issues of Process,
Doctrine, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 277 (1987); James C. Stanley, Note, Asbestos In Schools: The
Asbestos Hazard Emergency Response Act and School Asbestos Litigation, 42 VAND. L. REV. 1685
(1989); Mary K. Reeder, Note, Asbestos Litigation: The Insurance Coverage Question, 15 IND. L.
REV. 831 (1982); Darlene Echols, Comment, Bankruptcy, Hazardous Waste and Mass Tort: A Top
Priority Review, 23 Hous. L. REv. 1243 (1986); Kaighn Smith, Jr., Note, Beyond the Equity Power
of Bankruptcy Courts: Toxic Tort Liabilities In Chapter 11 Cases, 38 ME. L. REv. 391 (1986);
Steve Gold, Note, Causation in Toxic Torts: Burdens of Proof, Standards of Persuasion, and
Statistical Evidence, 96 YALE. L.J. 376 (1986); Note, The Fairness and Constitutionality of Statutes
of Limitations for Toxic Ton Suits, 96 HARy. L. REv. 1683 (1983); Andrew C. Rose, Comment,
Federal Mass Tort Class Actions: A Step Toward Equity and Efficiency, 47 ALB. L. REV. 1180
(1983); David Walsh, Comment, The Fourth Circuit Review: Robins v. Piccinin: The Fourth
Circuit's Response to Bankruptcy and Mass Tort, 44 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 537 (1987); Palma J.
Strand, Note, The Inapplicability of Traditional TortAnalysis to Environmental Risks: 7he Example
of Toxie Waste Pollution Victim Compensation, 35 STAN. L. REv. 575 (1983); Elizabeth R.
Kacynski, Note, The Inclusion of Future Members in Rule 23(b)(2) Class Actions, 85 COLUM. L.
REv. 397 (1985); Note, The Manville Bankruptcy: Treating Mass Tort Claims in Chapter 11
Proceedings, 96 HARy. L. REv. 1121 (1983); Richard A. Chesley & Kathleen Woods Kolodgy,
Note, Mass Exposure Torts: An Efficient Solution to a Complex Problem, 54 U. CIN. L. REv. 467
(1985); Margaret I. Lyle, Note, Mass Tort Claims and the Corporate Tortfeasor: Bankruptcy
Reorganization and Legislative Compensation Versus the Common-Law Tort System, 61 TEx. L.
REV. 1297 (1983); Paul S. Bird, Note, Mass Tort Litigation: A Statutory Solution to the Choice of
Law Impasse, 96 YALE L.J. 1077 (1987); Ellen Tannenbaum, Note, The Pratt-Weinstein Approach
to Mass Tort Litigation, 52 BROOK. L. REV. 455 (1986); James L. Connaughton, Comment,
RecoveryforRisk Comes ofAge: Asbestos in Schools and the Duty to Abate a Latent Environmental
Hazard, 83 Nw. U. L. REv. 512 (1989); Louis Treiger, Comment, Relieffor Asbestos Victims: A
Legislative Analysis, 20 HARv. J. ON LEGIS. 179 (1983); Albert P. Bedecarre, Comment, Rule 42(b)
Bifurcation at an Extreme: Polyfurcation of Liability Issues in Environmental Tort Cases, 17 B.C.
ENVrL. AFF. L. REV. 123 (1989); Sharon Youdelman, Note, Strategic Bankruptcies: Class Actions,
Classification and the Dalkon Shield Cases, 7 CARDOZO L. REV. 817 (1986); Christopher M. E.
Painter, Note, Tort Creditor Priority in the Secured Credit System: Asbestos Times, The Worst of
Times, 36 STAN. L. REv. 1045 (1984); James W. Elrod, Comment, The Use of Federal Class
Actions in Mass Toxic Pollution Tons, 56 TENN. L. REv. 243 (1988); Kim Marie Covello, Note,
Wilson v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp. and Statutes of Limitations in Latent Injury Litigation: An
Equitable Expansion of the Discovery Rule, 32 CATH. U. L. REV. 471 (1983).
Blomquist: An Introduction to American Toxic Tort Law:  Three Overarching Me
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 1992
806 VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 26
Evidence, and Science.
8. Some Jurisprudential Questions Regarding Toxic Torts.
9. The Future of Toxic Torts.
In the final analysis, however, modem toxic tort law will continue to evolve
over time and will continue to pose challenges to our collective understanding.
If the framework of synthesis and analysis discussed in this article offers some
modest insights about this perplexing and important subject, it will have fulfilled
its purpose.
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